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June Rhee,2 Lily S. Engbith,3 Greg Feldberg,4 and Andrew Metrick5
Yale Program on Financial Stability Survey
July 15, 2022
Abstract
This paper is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers seeking to establish
a market support program (MSP). Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who have
already made the decision to use an MSP in designing the most effective program possible.
Our insights derive from 23 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced
and existing literature on the topic.
By the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), market-based finance and traditional
banking systems were significantly intertwined, and the panic in market-based finance
threatened to spread quickly to both traditional banks and the real economy. In response,
authorities in several advanced economies rolled out MSPs to ease the stress in wholesalefunding markets. In an earlier study, we surveyed 19 of these GFC-era programs along with
two pre-GFC programs of similar design.
The GFC programs were just a prelude, however, as central banks established or revived a
variety of MSPs during the early months of the COVID-19 crisis. Many countries in both
advanced and emerging markets acted quickly to improve liquidity and restore confidence
in critical funding markets, as well as restart the flow of credit to households and businesses.
In our review of these cases, we identified four major themes: (1) speed is important in the
acute phase; (2) clear communication is a valuable policy tool in the acute phase, as
announcement effects can be powerful; (3) combining MSPs with backup fiscal support can
be a valuable tool; and (4) the use of a special purpose vehicle to house and manage the assets
obtained through the program from the markets can be beneficial.
Keywords: market-based finance, market-maker, market support, wholesale funding

This survey explores part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the COVID-19 crisis that pertain to market support programs. Cases are
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Introductory Note: This survey is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers
seeking to establish a market support program (MSP). It is based on insights derived from
case studies of 23 specific MSPs the Yale Program on Financial Stability has completed and
from the existing literature on the topic. Although this survey can help inform a decision
about whether to establish an MSP, our main purpose is to assist policymakers who have
already made that decision in designing the most effective program possible. In analyzing
the programs that are the focus of this survey, we used a color-coded system to highlight
certain particularly noteworthy design features.
Color
BLUE – INTERESTING

YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED

Meaning
A design feature that is interesting and that
policymakers may want to consider. Typically,
this determination is based on the observation
that the design feature involves a unique and
potentially promising way of addressing a
challenge common to this type of program that
may not be obvious. Less commonly, empirical
evidence or a consensus will indicate that the
design feature was effective in this context, in
which case we will describe that evidence or
consensus.
A design feature that policymakers should
exercise caution in considering. Typically, this
determination is based on the observation that
the designers of the feature later made
significant changes with the intention of
improving the program. Less commonly,
empirical evidence or a consensus will indicate
that the design feature was ineffective in this
context, in which case we will describe that
evidence or consensus.

This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not
highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that it
will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is
not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or
will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide
readers toward certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth
considering or (2) require caution.

180

Market Support Programs

Rhee et al.

Introduction
In the past few decades, activity in market-based finance 6 has steadily increased. The
market-based finance system performs essentially the same functions as the traditional
banking system, but with much lighter and less consistent regulation. By the onset of the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), market-based finance and traditional banking systems were
significantly intertwined, and the panic in market-based finance threatened to spread
quickly to both traditional banks and the real economy. In response, authorities in several
advanced economies rolled out market support programs (MSPs) to ease the stress in
wholesale-funding markets. In an earlier study, Rhee et al. (2020), we surveyed 19 of these
GFC-era programs along with two pre-GFC programs of similar design.
The GFC programs were just a prelude, however, as central banks established or revived a
variety of MSPs during the early months of the COVID-19 crisis. In March 2020, corporate
spreads in advanced economies surged, and commercial paper (CP) markets and assetbacked securities (ABS) markets came to a halt. This “dash-for-cash” also disrupted the safest
fixed-income markets of US Treasuries and euro area sovereign bonds (Cantú et al. 2021).
Around the same period, in emerging markets, the pandemic brought a sudden stop to capital
inflows, leading to sharp currency depreciation and further tightening of financial conditions
(Cantú et al. 2021).
Many countries in both advanced and emerging markets acted quickly to improve liquidity
and restore confidence in critical funding markets, as well as restart the flow of credit to
households and businesses. Within a matter of weeks between March and April 2020, the
Federal Reserve, Bank of England (BoE), Bank of Japan (BoJ), and European Central Bank
(ECB) established numerous MSPs, many of which were similar to programs these
jurisdictions had used in the GFC. Some countries, such as Canada, experimented with MSPs
for the first time. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that for the first time, at
least 18 emerging-market economies’ central banks adopted asset purchases targeting
government or private sector bonds in local currency (IMF 2020).
The MSPs of the COVID-19 era built upon and expanded the GFC-era programs in several
ways. Given these innovations, a timely update of our previous survey is warranted. This
paper attempts to deliver by analyzing 23 COVID-19-era MSPs from nine jurisdictions—
Canada (CA), the European Union (EU), Israel (IS), Japan (JN), South Korea (KR), Sweden
(SW), Thailand (TH), the United Kingdom (UK), and the US. Figure 1 lists the 23 case studies
and their respective authors. Figure 2 summarizes each program’s key goals.

“Market-based finance” is loosely defined as the system of markets, nonbank financial institutions, and
infrastructure that provide financial services to support the economy, along with banks. Parallel terms include
“shadow banking” and “nonbank financial intermediation.”
6
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Figure 1: YPFS Market Support Programs Case Studies
Case Title
Canada: Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility
Canada: Commercial Paper Purchase Program
Canada: Corporate Bond Purchase Program
Canada: Government Bond Purchase Program
Canada: Mortgage Bond Purchase Program
Canada: Provincial Bond Purchase Program
Canada: Provincial Money Market Purchase Program
Eurozone: Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme
Israel: Corporate Bond Purchase Program
Japan: Special Funds-Supplying Operations
South Korea: Corporate Liquidity Support Organization
Sweden: Commercial Paper Purchases
Sweden: Corporate Bond Purchases
Thailand: Bond Stabilization Fund
United Kingdom: Asset Purchase Facility
United Kingdom: COVID Corporate Financing Facility
United States: Commercial Paper Funding Facility II
United States: Corporate Credit Facilities
United States: Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
United States: Municipal Liquidity Facility
United States: Primary Dealer Credit Facility
United States: Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity
Facility
United States: Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility II
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Abbreviation
BAPF (CA)
CPPP (CA)
CBPP (CA)
GBPP (CA)
CMBP (CA)
PBPP (CA)
PMMPP (CA)
PEPP (EU)
CBPP (IS)
SFSO (JN)
Special SPV (KR)
CPP (SW)
CBP (SW)
BSF (TH)
APF (UK)
CCFF (UK)
CPFF II II (US)
CCFs (US)
MMLF (US)
MLF (US)
PDCF (US)
PPPLF (US)

Reference
(Runkel 2022a)
(Engbith 2022a)
(Nunn 2022a)
(Runkel 2022b)
(Vergara 2022)
(Leonard 2022a)
(Engbith 2022b)
(Runkel 2022c)
(Leonard 2022b)
(Nunn 2022b)
(Engbith 2022c)
(Mott 2022a)
(Mott 2022b)
(Runkel 2022d)
(Kulam 2022a)
(Kulam 2022b)
(Engbith 2022d)
(Leonard 2022c)
(Mott and Dreyer 2022)
(Kelly 2022b)
(Mott 2022c)
(Kelly 2022c)

TALF II II (US)

(Engbith 2022e)
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Figure 2: Targeted Markets and Other Goals for Covered MSPs
Purposea

Commercial
paper

Liquidity

CPFF II (US);
MMLF (US);
CCFF (UK); CPP
(SW); Special
SPV (KR); CPPP
(CA)

Creditb

MMLF (US);
CPP (SW);
CPPP (CA)

Interbank

MBS/ABSc

SFSO (JN);
BAPF (CA)

PDCF (US);
TALF II
(US); CMBP
(CA)

Municipal
bonds

Corporate
bonds

CPFF II
(US); MLF
(US); MMLF
(US); PBPP
(CA);
PMMPP
(CA); APF
(UK); PEPP
(EU)

CCFs (US); PDCF
(US); CBPP (IS);
CBPP (CA); GBPP
(CA); Special SPV
(KR); APF (UK);
BSF (TH); CBP
(SW)

TALF II (US)

Stocks
PDCF (US)

PPPLF (US);
SFSO (JN); CBPP
(IS); BAPF (CA)

(a) We look at the official press releases of the programs to discern the stated purpose of the programs. Any
purposes added or changed by governors or other related officials are not reflected in this figure but in Key
Design Decision No. 6, Communication.
(b) Includes credit to households and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
(c) MBS/ABS = mortgaged-backed securities/asset-backed securities
Source: Authors’ analysis.

One interesting difference between the MSPs of the GFC and COVID-19 eras is that during
the former, most financial institutions were in a weakened state and needed their own rescue
programs. In the COVID-19 era, financial institutions—particularly the large banks—were in
a much stronger position and, in many cases, served as conduits and force multipliers for the
programs.
Another difference between the two eras was the broadening of goals during the COVID-19
crisis. The MSPs studied here, unlike the GFC-era programs, had a variety of goals that
extended beyond the emergency-liquidity injections. Specifically, several of these programs
included “credit support” as a key objective. The distinction between liquidity and credit
support goals can be subtle, and policymakers must be clear with market participants (and
with themselves) when designing MSPs with these distinctive goals.
To illustrate the challenge, it is helpful to think of financial crises and policy responses as
having two phases, “acute” and “chronic.” In the initial acute phase, the financial system has
an obvious liquidity problem—runs on banks and freezes of short-term financing markets
are easy to spot—but the underlying solvency of the financial system is difficult to judge in
the heat of that moment. During this acute phase, policy responses need to be fast and
emphasize direct liquidity support, either in the form of emergency lending or liability
guarantees. To achieve these goals, policy should be targeted to influence the behavior of the
suppliers of short-term credit rather than the troubled financial institutions or markets
themselves.
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In the later chronic phase, the immediate liquidity pressures have eased, but any underlying
solvency problems remain. In the traditional banking sector, a chronic phase is often
characterized by low capital levels at banks that hold back long-term lending. In economies
where market-based finance plays a large role, these solvency concerns can manifest at many
levels along the intermediation chain, with the same result of insufficient credit supply. A
chronically weak financial sector is a drag on economic growth, and a main reason that
downturns are deeper and recoveries take longer in recessions that follow financial crises
(Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2013). During the chronic phase, policy should be targeted to
influence the behavior of long-term credit suppliers, typically the financial institutions
themselves. With the rise of market-based finance, those targeted financial institutions may
be diverse and not limited to banks.
This staging into acute and chronic phases can apply both to full-blown financial crises like
the GFC and to possible or incipient crises such as seen in the early stages of the COVID-19
crisis. During the GFC, almost all of the market support programs we analyzed were designed
to meet the challenges of an acute phase and were properly targeted to affect the behavior
of short-term creditors with direct liquidity support. The one chronic-phase MSP program
we analyzed was the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF II) in the US, which
the Fed launched six months after the failure of Lehman Brothers to enable the issuance of
asset-backed securities.
The COVID-19 era was different. Even though all the MSPs covered in this survey were
introduced during the acute phase of the crisis, the policymakers understood that the size of
the real shock was large enough to threaten some long-term chronic weakness in the
economy. Thus, some of the programs were designed with this chronic phase in mind and
included incentives for long-term credit support. These design features, often introduced
quickly alongside the liquidity support functions, later served as a model for more direct
credit support programs outside the scope of this survey. For example, the Fed’s Main Street
Lending Program (MSLP), announced in early April 2020, is outside the scope of this survey
because its primary purpose was not to address market malfunctions. Rather, the MSLP was
meant to help facilitate access to credit so that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
could better manage the period of dislocations related to the pandemic.
The addition of credit support goals to these programs raises questions about the distinction
between MSPs and unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing (QE). For
the purposes of this survey, we use the program motivation as the defining feature: in an
MSP, a program’s primary impetus is to restore the flow of credit by fixing a perceived
malfunction in market functioning. This malfunction may be driven by balance sheet
weaknesses (as in the GFC), highly elevated levels of uncertainty (as in the COVID-19 era), or
just “plumbing” problems (as in concerns around the technical problems associated with the
transition to the year 2000). In contrast, QE is a form of monetary policy, attempting to
increase the flow of credit by changing the yield curve beyond the conventional target of the
short-term risk-free rate; in QE, market malfunction is not assumed. For an MSP to justify its
role in the chronic phase, the market malfunction must have the potential to persist beyond
the acute phase.
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In our review of these cases, we identified four major themes.
Speed is important in the acute phase. To implement programs quickly, a clear
understanding of the central bank’s authority for launching MSPs is crucial. As authorities
use the gap between crises to revise a central bank’s legal authorities, they should consider
the implications of such revision in the central bank’s ability to quickly respond to fight a
financial crisis.
Clear communication is a valuable policy tool in the acute phase, as announcement effects
can be powerful. The authorities may be tempted to add broader purposes that are
unattainable or unrelated to the crisis at hand, to enhance their political viability. For
example, saying bond purchases will save jobs is “unattainable”; saying purchases must be
reviewed for their environmental impact is “unrelated.” Such additions can slow
implementation and lead to confused communications.
Combining MSPs with backup fiscal support can be a valuable tool. In the acute phase, such
fiscal support can make the government commitment more credible and can have powerful
effects without ever being drawn. In the chronic phase, fiscal support can allow for
aggressive and tailored programs, giving the designers the flexibility of targeted credit
subsidies. In the COVID-19 crisis, the financial markets and institutions bounced back fast
enough that these credit support programs went largely unutilized. But we should not miss
this opportunity to learn from the varied design features.
The use of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to house and manage the assets obtained through
the program from the markets can be beneficial for many reasons. SPVs are not just a
gimmick to get around legal restrictions; instead, proper use of SPVs can streamline the
management, transparency, and flexibility of individual programs. Given the need for speed
emphasized in theme (1) above, planning specific SPV structures well before a crisis hits is
useful.
As in the GFC, governments introduced various other emergency measures as part of a
package with MSPs during the COVID-19 crisis. Regulatory forbearance can be an important
part of that package, by easing liquidity or capital rules to enhance the effectiveness of an
MSP or waiving lending or other restrictions that may be prohibitive.
The next section of this survey discusses each of the 21 Key Design Decisions in detail,
highlighting cases where future designers should take note of both interesting ideas and
cautionary lessons. Some of these Key Design Decisions did not appear in our earlier survey,
usually because those features did not seem as important in the earlier cases. Following the
discussion of Key Design Decisions, we conclude with some broad themes and connections
to the (still small) academic literature on program evaluation.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: What was the stated purpose of the program that the central bank or
other authorities described in press releases or other materials?
Central banks that established COVID-19-era MSPs shared similar motivations. As during the
GFC, they targeted the markets for CP, corporate bonds, repurchase agreements (repos), and
ABS. Some jurisdictions expanded the markets in which central banks intervened. For
example, the US announced new MSPs to intervene in corporate- and municipal-bond
markets. Canada, announcing a wide array of MSPs for the first time, included provincialgovernment funding markets, markets acting as a benchmark for setting floating interest
rates for its derivative markets, and corporate-bond markets.
In addition to stabilizing targeted markets, some MSPs further added the goal of facilitating
credit provision to individuals and SMEs. This expanded mandate marked a consequential
shift in MSP objectives, extending these programs from their acute-phase role during the GFC
to include broader goals consistent with the (expected) chronic phase of the COVID-19 crisis.
For example, US PDCF, PPPLF, and TALF II; Canada BAPF, CPPP, and CMBP; and Japan SFSO
added objectives to support SMEs’ funding markets. Some market support programs
morphed into QE programs. Canada, the EU, Israel, and Thailand highlighted the aim of
monetary policy transmission in their MSPs. Canada GBPP, in particular, subsequently
shifted its focus to support the resumption of growth in output and employment as market
conditions improved for government bonds. The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report in
October 2020 noted that emerging-market economy central banks’ MSPs tended to have
narrower aims than those of the advanced economy central banks, which engaged in larger
balance sheet expansions to alleviate market stress and boost output (IMF 2020).
2. Part of a Package: Did the authorities announce any other interventions at the
same time as MSPs?
Central banks announced COVID-19 MSPs alongside many other emergency-liquidity and
fiscal support programs. Figure 3 lists the programs announced within the two-week time
frame before and after the announcement of each MSP. Aside from the policy interventions
surveyed in Figure 3, one interesting initiative to note is that the Swedish government
announced that the government would increase the limit of its guarantees of bonds and other
debt issued by Swedish export companies the day after it announced its MSPs. In the US, the
Fed introduced all MSPs within a period of a few weeks, contemporaneously with
emergency-liquidity operations for banks and direct fiscal assistance for individuals, SMEs,
and airlines. In other jurisdictions, the authorities launched support measures for
individuals and SMEs and other efforts to deal with the pandemic itself.
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Figure 3: Policy Interventions Announced around the Time of MSPs

Country

Canada

EU
Israel
Japan
South
Korea
Sweden
Thailand
UK

US

Program

Date announced

BAPF
CMBP
PMMPP
CPPP
GBPP
CBPP
PBPP
PEPP
CBPP
SFSO
Special
SPV
CBP
CPP
BSF
CCFF
APF
CPFF II
PDCF
MMLF
CCFs
TALF II
MLF
PPPLF

March 13, 2020
March 16, 2020
March 24, 2020
March 27, 2020
March 27, 2020
April 15, 2020
April 15, 2020
March 18, 2020
July 6, 2020
March 16, 2020

Emergency
liquidity

Fiscal
support for
SMEs

Fiscal
support for
individuals

Fiscal support
for specific
industries

Macroprudential
policies*
C
S
M

April 22, 2020
March 19, 2020
March 19, 2020
March 22, 2020
March 17, 2020
March 19, 2020
March 17, 2020
March 17, 2020
March 18, 2020
March 23, 2020
March 23, 2020
April 9, 2020
April 9, 2020

Blue highlight = Program announced the same day, or within 14 days before or after, the MSP
*C = Changes in a preannounced countercyclical policy tool to ease financial conditions during a crisis; S = Changes
in supervisory rules or guidance that ease capital, liquidity, or other requirements for financial businesses; M =
Changes in market rules that seek to promote financial stability in a crisis.
Source: Authors’ analysis.

Fiscal authorities also supported central bank actions, as discussed in more detail in Key
Design Decision No. 10, Source(s) of Funding. Similarly, central banks indirectly supported
fiscal expansion via MSPs, as discussed further in Key Design Decision No. 6, Communication.
3. Legal Authority: Which authority or law enabled the central bank or other
authorities to launch the program? What are the interesting changes in ordinary
and emergency authorities of the central banks under law?
As seen in the GFC and discussed in our previous survey, central banks used a mix of ordinary
and emergency authorities to implement MSPs during the COVID-19 crisis. Post-GFC, some
jurisdictions changed the central bank’s authority to reflect concerns raised during the GFC
experience. In particular, surveying the recent resurrection of MSPs in the US has clarified
some questions relating to the interpretation of the Fed’s emergency or crisis-fighting
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powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA). Figure 4 summarizes the
central banks’ authorities in launching the MSPs and some post-GFC changes in ordinary and
emergency authorities for central banks relevant to COVID-19 era MSPs.
Figure 4: Central Banks’ Legal Authority to Launch MSPs
Jurisdiction

Existing legal authority
at program launch

Emergency or
ordinary
authority?

Post-GFC changes affecting
COVID-19 response

Section 18 of the Bank of Canada Act

Ordinary

Broadened ordinary power, allowing the
central bank to: (1) engage in outright
purchases or sale transactions rather than
buybacks only; and (2) remove the 380day limit on the terms of its transactions.

Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union

Ordinary

N/A

Israel

Chapter 5, Section 36(2) of the Bank of
Israel Law

Ordinary

N/A

Japan

Article 33 of the Bank of Japan Act

Ordinary

N/A

Canada

European
Union

South Korea

Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act

Emergency

For a swifter response in emergency
situations, the act eliminated the
requirement for monetary contraction to
exist for the Bank of Korea to use its
emergency power; under the revised law,
the possibility of disruption in credit
intermediation would suffice.

Sweden

Chapter 6, Article 5 of the Sveriges
Riksbank Act

Ordinary

N/A

Thailand

Emergency Decree B.E. 2563 (2020)

Emergency

N/A

UK

Bank of England Act (APF); Financial
Services Act 2021 (CCFF)

Ordinary (APF);
Emergency (CCFF)

US

Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act

Emergency

Pre-GFC, the BoE had broad authority to
lend and purchase in the financial
markets, but its authority did not specify
how BoE ought to act in response to crisis
conditions.
Post-GFC, the law clarified that the BoE
has the primary operational responsibility
for financial crisis management while Her
Majesty’s Treasury has sole responsibility
for any decision involving public funds.
Only broad-based support is possible for
solvent institutions.

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Governments often used existing legislation to commit taxpayer funds to emergency
programs. In the US, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, signed
into law on March 27, 2020, expanded Treasury’s resources to provide equity support for
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the CCFs, CPFF II, MLF, and TALF II. Other MSPs in the US received Treasury support through
the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) but not under the CARES Act. Details of these funding
mechanisms are further discussed in Key Design Decision No. 10, Source(s) of Funding.
MSPs often face political headwinds, as they typically entail public support for private actors.
Once a crisis has passed, those headwinds can lead legislatures to curtail rather than expand
the central bank’s crisis-fighting powers. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFA) added restrictions to the Fed’s emergency
authority, which the Fed had to take into account when creating all of its COVID-19-era MSPs.
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act had long allowed the Fed “in unusual and exigent
circumstances” to provide support to any market participant. Under the revised Section
13(3), any emergency Fed program must have “broad-based eligibility”; obtain prior
approval from the Treasury secretary; and be available only for solvent institutions (FRA
1913b).
The Fed subsequently amended Regulation A, which implements the FRA, to conform with
the DFA. Regulation A allows the Fed to rely on, among other evidence, written certifications
of solvency and of inability to secure adequate credit accommodations from other sources
by the recipients of the Fed’s emergency assistance to satisfy the conditions in Section 13(3)
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2015). The Fed had interpreted Section
13(3)’s language about a lack of “adequate credit” to mean that the borrower could “consider
economic or market conditions as compared to usual economic or market conditions,
including the availability and price of credit,” acknowledging that “lending may be available,
but at prices or on conditions that are inconsistent with a normal, well-functioning market”
(Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 2020).
However, the Fed interpreted Regulation A to be merely one way by which it can extend
credit, rather than as describing additional requirements to satisfy before it can offer any
discounts under Section 13(3). Consistent with this view, the Fed did not apply the penalty
rate provision to its Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) purchases
(Congressional Oversight Commission 2020b). Further detailed discussion of these issues
can be found in Key Design Decision No. 15, Haircuts or Discounts, and Key Design Decision
No. 11, Eligible Institution, respectively.
Some post-GFC analyses, including our first MSP paper, explain the Fed’s Section 13(3)
authority to mean that the Fed could use its emergency authority only to extend loans to
participants in its MSPs, and not to directly purchase market instruments. However, an
internal Fed legal memo from 2008 states that the Fed faces no such constraint. The legal
memo was revealed in 2014 during a lawsuit brought by Starr International Company, Inc.,
on behalf of the shareholders of American International Group, Inc. (AIG) against the US
government (Starr Int’l Co. v. United States 2017). According to the 2008 memo, the Fed
Board “consistently has viewed the term ‘discount’ under section 13(3) as including a
Reserve Bank extension of credit . . . as well as a purchase by a Reserve Bank of third-party
notes” (Alvarez et al. 2008; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1958). This
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point is further clarified by Scott Alvarez, then general counsel of the Fed, in a YPFS interview
(Kelly 2022a).
Central banks and governments responding to the COVID-19 crisis early on were able to
avoid the political headwinds experienced during the GFC, given the unusually exogenous
nature of the crisis. But political support waned in the US as market conditions eased. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (signed into law on December 27, 2020)
definitively closed the CARES Act MSPs and rescinded any funding of the TALF II, MLF, and
CCFs that was not needed to meet existing commitments as of January 9, 2021. The act
removed the Treasury’s authority to use ESF funds to support an MSP that is “the same as”
the MLF and CCFs;7 it made an exception for the TALF II (“Consolidated Appropriations Act”
2021). How broadly the Treasury will interpret the “same as” language in the future remains
an open question. Depending on the interpretation, if the Fed wants to create an MSP like the
MLF or CCFs in the future, it may have to find other ways to secure the loans to its
satisfaction, without relying on the Treasury or ESF, unless Congress passes new legislation
saying otherwise. Although the Fed has constructed MSPs without Treasury’s support in the
past, during the COVID-19 crisis, the Treasury backing helped the Fed broaden the range of
collateral it accepted and launch MSPs that it normally may not have had an appetite to
launch.
Post-GFC, the UK clarified the BoE’s emergency authority under the Financial Services Act of
2012. Pre-GFC, the BoE had broad authority to lend and purchase securities in financial
markets, but its authority was ambiguous on the details. The Financial Services Act of 2012
and a 2017 memorandum of understanding among Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), the BoE,
and the Prudential Regulatory Authority stated that the BoE has the primary operational
responsibility for financial crisis management, while HMT has sole responsibility for any
decision involving public funds. The BoE and HMT collaborated on both the Asset Purchase
Facility (APF) and the COVID Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF): the facilities were wholly
owned by the HMT, while the BoE operationalized them. Therefore, any losses of the BoE
were to be indemnified by HMT, as discussed further in Key Design Decision No. 10,
Source(s) of Funding.
Some jurisdictions expanded the central bank’s crisis-fighting authorities in the midst of the
GFC. In Canada, paragraph 18(g) of the Bank of Canada Act gave the Bank of Canada (BoC)
broad discretion to buy and sell securities in ordinary and crisis times8 (“Bank of Canada
Act” 1985). Prior to the GFC, the Bank of Canada Act limited the securities that the BoC could
buy and sell in normal times to short-term (less than 180-day) credit endorsed, accepted, or
issued by a bank (“Bank of Canada Act” 1985). In 2008, Parliament broadened the scope of
this ordinary authority to allow the purchase or sale of any security issued by any person,
other than equity interests. The 2008 revision also clarified that the BoC had this authority
The act also removed the Treasury’s authority to use ESF funds to support a program that is “the same as” the
MSLP, but we did not include this above as the survey excludes MSLP from the discussion of MSPs.
8 Allowed the central bank to purchase any security (including equity) in a crisis, “if the Governor is of the
opinion that there is a severe and unusual stress on a financial market or the financial system” (“Bank of Canada
Act” 1985). This power has been in effect since 2001.
7
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“for the purposes of conducting monetary policy or promoting the stability of the Canadian
financial system” (Bank of Canada 2008). During the COVID-19 crisis, instead of invoking
emergency authority, the BoC used its ordinary authority for the MSPs, as it did not use any
programs to purchase equity interests. To date, the BoC has never taken action under the
emergency authority.
Sweden’s national legislature had been considering proposals to curtail its central bank’s
emergency authority when the COVID-19 crisis began. The proposals had not yet passed the
legislature and thus did not affect the central bank’s response during the COVID-19 crisis.
Currently, the central bank may lend against collateral during its monetary policy
operations; purchase, sell, and mediate9 securities, foreign exchange, and obligations linked
to such assets; and issue its own debt instruments to monetary policy counterparties
(Andersson and Stenström 2021, 6; “Sveriges Riksbank Act” 2016). The national legislature
criticized the lack of oversight of the central bank’s activities, noting its high degree of
independence relative to other central banks (Ministry of Finance 2019). In 2019, the
national legislature proposed a revised law that would limit central bank purchases of nonsovereign assets to extraordinary circumstances and would restrict the range of corporate
bonds and other private securities that are eligible for purchase by the central bank (Ministry
of Finance 2019; Sveriges Riksbank 2020a). If passed, the new act would take effect in 2023
(Sveriges Riksbank 2021b).
4. Governance: What were the legally mandated reporting, auditing, and oversight
for the programs?
This Key Design Decision covers legally mandated reporting, auditing, and other oversight
of the MSPs. These directives are imposed as conditions to exercising central banks’
authority for MSPs. Legislation responding to a crisis may also create additional, temporary
responsibilities.
All programs we surveyed made regular reports to congressional committees, legislatures,
or fiscal authorities on the programs’ operations and usage. Although these reports were not
always mandated, some central banks, such as those in Israel, Japan, and Sweden, chose to
report out the information on the programs voluntarily. US authorities required the Fed’s
MSPs, on the other hand, to report to congressional committees on the usage of the
programs, with additional reporting obligations imposed under the CARES Act for select
programs. Canada and the UK required their central banks to regularly report MSP activities
to fiscal authorities. Additionally, the Bank of Korea (BoK) was required to deliver
assessment reports semiannually to the legislature. Key Design Decision No. 7, Disclosure,
further details information about disclosure on program usage and operations.
The UK and Canada required audits of the programs’ annual financial statements. Under the
Bank of Canada Act 1985, for example, the BoC is mandated to release audited financial
statements, and the minister of finance can appoint the auditors for the central bank; those
Mediate means the central bank is acting as an intermediary or dealer for the securities market. Sweden has
a large and developed securities market, so the central bank needs this intermediary or dealer authority to
maintain rates in the securities market in line with monetary policy.
9
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auditors report on the central bank’s affairs to the minister. Some US programs with SPVs
also released audited financial statements, but whether the audit was legally mandated is
unclear.
5. Administration: How was the program run day to day?
Central banks took the lead in the daily operations of most market support programs. Some
MSPs used industry participants to assist with the operations. Canada, the US, and Thailand
hired private institutions to serve as asset managers, clearing banks, and advisors to help
design their programs. As in GFC-era MSPs, this assistance was helpful for central banks as
the private entities had existing relationships, infrastructure, and expertise that the central
banks lacked.
South Korea used a slightly more complex structure in operating its program. A committee
consisting of five members—the Korea Development Bank (KDB) 10 vice chairman, one
private sector expert nominated by the KDB (with approval from other institutions), and one
nomination each by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 11 the Financial Services
Commission,12 and the BoK—oversaw the program’s daily operations.
6. Communication: Any interesting communication strategies to note?
During the COVID-19 crisis, the announcement effect for MSPs was sometimes sufficient on
its own to calm markets, even without any significant program usage to follow. Empirical
evidence supports this conclusion for the CCFs, CPFF II, MLF, and TALF II in the US. The
Swedish CBP, in its initial announcement, did not even communicate a starting date for
corporate-bond purchases, instead stating that purchases would begin sometime during the
period of March–December 2020. However, the announcement in March 2020 was sufficient
to calm the markets (Hansson and Birging 2021).
Some programs later corrected miscommunications by the head of the central bank. Before
the PEPP was announced, ECB President Christine Lagarde said that the Governing Council
was “not here to close spreads” (Lagarde and de Guindos 2020). Yields on eurozone debt
spiked after the comment, with the lowest-rated eurozone sovereigns seeing the largest
spikes in volatility and yield (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
2007–2021; Reuters 2020). Lagarde later walked back the point, but a report to the
European Parliament stated that it was “reasonable to think that the implementation of this
program was, if not due to, at least brought forward because of President Lagarde’s
comment” (Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020). Markets appeared to react positively to the
announcement of the PEPP (Blot, Creel, and Hubert 2020).
In other instances, mixed messaging from the central bank attracted criticism. Some
criticisms may be more concerning than others, especially if the mixed messaging implied
A state bank through which the fiscal authority provided funding for the program.
The fiscal authority.
12 Supervisory authority.
10
11
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that the central bank’s actions were not independent but rather orchestrated by the
government. The BoE’s APF stated that its purpose was to improve market functioning of the
gilt and corporate-bond markets. However, some public and private actors thought that the
BoE’s goal for the APF was to lower the cost of government borrowings, which could imply
the BoE was engaged in monetary financing of the government. This belief was partly
because the speed of HMT’s issuance of government debt appeared to match the speed of the
BoE’s gilt purchases under the APF. BoE Governor Andrew Bailey has also noted that if the
BoE had not intervened with asset purchases, the government would have struggled to fund
itself in the short run. Later, Bailey rejected any accusations of the BoE financing the
government, and BoE officials publicly clarified that the primary purpose of the APF was to
support market functioning. Critics from the House of Lords still argued that the BoE did not
sufficiently explain how the asset purchases served the BoE’s mandate. The House of Lords
cautioned that the BoE’s ability to control inflation and maintain financial stability could be
undermined if market participants believed that the BoE had engaged in monetary financing
during the crisis.
In the US, the Fed, in the press release announcing the two CCF facilities, stated that their
purpose was to “support credit to large employers,” with a distinction between the Primary
Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) provision of “new bond and loan issuance” and
the SMCCF provision of “liquidity for outstanding corporate bonds” (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System 2020a). Fed officials, including Daleep Singh, executive vice
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, emphasized in speeches that by
supporting “companies’ access to funding, firms employing millions of Americans [were] in
a better position to keep workers on payrolls” and cited statistics on the number of
employees that public-bond-issuing companies had on payroll (Powell 2021; Singh 2020).
Chair Jerome Powell further emphasized that purchasing corporate bonds allowed
companies “to go out and finance themselves. They’ve been able to avoid big layoffs” (Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis 2020). These comments attracted critics who noted
that the program had aided companies and their investors but not workers. The House of
Representatives Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus found that of the 500 corporations
whose bonds the Fed purchased on the secondary market, 140 had furloughed or laid off a
combined 1 million workers, 383 had paid dividends, and 227 had been “accused of illegal
conduct since 2017” (Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis 2020).
In this example, we see how authorities were challenged by internal and external pressures
to extend acute-phase designs to support goals typically associated with chronic phases.
With programs based in whole or part on GFC-era designs, communication sometimes
veered to suggest broader-based credit support goals. This communication challenge can
interfere with otherwise powerful market-calming announcement effects.
7. Disclosure: What were the obligations and practices around disclosure of the
usage and participants of the program? How detailed were the disclosures, who
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could access the disclosed information, and was there a lag between usage and
disclosure?
Central banks tended not to disclose lists of institutions participating in the MSPs during
their operation, but they often did disclose aggregate transaction information with a lag.
Figure 5 shows the disclosures and requirements in aggregate and transactional-level data.
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Figure 5: Disclosure of Data on Program Operations and Usage
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The BoC disclosed aggregate transaction data every week and participant-level data after
each MSP had terminated. Although this transaction-level reporting was beyond the legal
mandate of disclosure for the BoC, it was faithful to their extralegal commitment to the
principle of transparency. The Bank of Israel (BoI) also voluntarily disclosed monthly
transaction data for its program.
In our previous survey on the GFC-era MSPs, we highlighted stigma issues related to
disclosure and the concern that new post-GFC mandates could exacerbate the stigma
problem. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required the Fed to provide Congress with a report
including information on the transactions and expected cost to taxpayers within a week of
the establishment of a Section 13(3) facility (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2020b;
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2020e). In making these required
disclosures, the Fed sometimes withheld details that could identify specific institutions, since
publicly disclosing this information could have “adversely” affected the program’s
participants by signaling an entity’s financial distress (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2020d; GAO 2020). Instead, the Fed disclosed the names and identifying
details of each participant in the facility one year following the effective date of termination,
pursuant to Section 11(s) of the Federal Reserve Act (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2022a; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2020b).
8. Use of SPV: Did the MSP use an SPV for operations that were separate from the
central bank’s balance sheet?
During the GFC, both the US and the UK utilized SPVs to administer some of their MSPs. A
crisis-fighting innovation at the time, this practice spread more widely in the COVID-19 crisis
to Japan, South Korea, and Thailand.
There are benefits to having an SPV, as we learned in the GFC-era MSPs:
(a) The Fed has viewed an SPV as a convenient structure providing management,
accounting, and legal advantages when it is operating multiple MSPs in parallel
(Bernanke et al. 2020; Kelly 2022a). Separate SPVs for each program allow the Fed
to better tailor and manage each program to its goals, terms, timeline, and capital
structure (Baxter 2009; Kelly 2022a).
(b) The SPV structure simplifies the reporting of income and the management of any
sales of assets discounted by the facility. The Fed provided separate annual financial
statements for the programs that were independently audited by an outside
accounting firm. These statements provided greater detail and transparency than
the Fed provided for facilities that did not use SPVs (Bernanke et al. 2020).
(c) The degree of corporate separation from both the Fed and other programs provides
some protection from and for other entities in legal actions (Kelly 2022a).
(d) The SPVs are typically quick, easy, and inexpensive to set up. The Fed has viewed its
creation of the structures as falling under the “incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking within the limitations” of the Federal
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Reserve Act (Bernanke et al. 2020; FRA 1913.; Kelly 2022a).
This time around, in the US, the CCFs, CPFF II, MLF, and TALF II used SPVs. In South Korea,
the SPV allowed for a complex funding structure amongst a state bank, the government, and
the central bank. In the UK CCFF, HMT directed the BoE to create an SPV, separate from the
central bank’s balance sheet, for the BoE to conduct special market assistance operations.
HMT was to indemnify the BoE for any losses of the BoE and the SPV stemming from the
program. The fiscal authority in Thailand also committed to indemnify the central bank for
any losses stemming from its MSP.
We note, however, as highlighted in the GFC-era survey, that setting up an SPV structure
involving multiple parties, with no prior experience at the time of the crisis, did delay some
MSPs during the GFC, affecting their efficacy. This can explain why South Korea assigned the
KDB, a state bank with experience, to design the SPV.
9. Size: Did the program have an overall size limit when announced? Did it have an
individual participation limit?
Overall Size of the Program
More programs during the COVID-19 crisis tended to be unlimited in size as compared to
GFC-era MSPs. As with its GFC-era predecessor, the COVID-era Japanese SFSO had no overall
size limit. Some GFC-era reiterations of MSPs in the US, such as the PDCF and MMLF, were
again unlimited in size when revived in 2020. By contrast, some new programs in the US,
such as the MLF and CCFs, and Canada’s GBPP did have size limits. Notably, the PPPLF lent
against only government-guaranteed PPP loans. The UK CCFF also did not have an overall
size limit, but individual participants’ primary issuances to the facility were limited
according to their long-term credit ratings.
Some MSPs were essentially unlimited, as the central banks announced that the size of the
program would match the market’s needs. Canada’s CMBP did not have an overall size limit
but targeted purchases of up to 500 million Canadian dollars per week, although the bank
retained the flexibility to adjust this target to reflect market conditions. Canada’s PMMPP
initially committed to purchasing up to 40% of each offering of directly issued provincial
money market securities. Canada’s CPPP and the US CPFF II set the maximum size of the
facility to the aggregate amount of CP that each eligible institution could issue to the
program.
In other instances where the size was limited, programs remained quite large. Sometimes
the limitations were driven by the support the program received from its fiscal authority. In
the US, the Fed set the overall size of the MLF, TALF II, and CCFs in proportion to the equity
support each received from the Treasury.
Some programs were smaller in size, as in Sweden, South Korea, and Thailand. However, as
noted in the GFC-era MSP survey, programs with the targeted purpose of “price discovery”
can be successful with smaller sizes. Specifically, in Thailand, central bank staff had noted
the dilemma between the public pressure to intervene in the corporate-debt market and the
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reluctancy of the central bank to lend directly to corporations. Therefore, the central bank
designed the program to act as a signal to calm the market but not to perform lending, and
ultimately there was no usage. This intention is reflected not only in the size of the program
but also in the more onerous terms of the program compared to others.
Individual Participation Limits
Although some MSPs set individual participation limits, most did not. The US CCFs, CPFF II,
and MLF had individual limits. For example, a municipal issuer could issue notes to the MLF up
to a total of 20% of its recent annual revenues. Canada’s PBPP also had a similar limit for a single
issuer. The EU PEPP followed the proportions already assigned to each sovereign, calculated
through total population and gross domestic product.
Japan’s SFSO set a maximum for individual participation based on not only the amount of eligible
collateral but also the financial institution’s amount of loans outstanding to SMEs, in response
to the COVID-19 crisis. Although this amount could not exceed the lesser of the value of the
total eligible collateral posted for the loan under the program or JYP 100 billion, the BoJ
removed this limit later to encourage even broader lending to SMEs. We find this structure
interesting because it directly linked the program’s credit support goals to the maximum
participation level, making program design congruent with program goals.

The UK CCFF restricted individual participants’ primary issuances to the facility based on
their long-term credit ratings. However, the overall size of the facility was unlimited, as
stated above.
10. Source(s) of Funding: Who funded the program? Who took the losses and in what
order?
The majority of MSPs were funded solely through the expansion of the central bank’s balance
sheet, as was the case in Canada, the EU, the UK, and Sweden. However, in an important shift
from GFC-era programs, fiscal authorities provided more support to central banks during
the COVID-19 crisis. Figure 6 shows a summary of entities—other than the central bank—
involved in the funding of the program.
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Figure 6: MSPs with Fiscal or Other Support
Program
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(a) Indemnification = indemnification by a fiscal authority; Equity investment = received equity investment
from the relevant fiscal authority.
(b) The Korea Development Bank, a state bank, provided the SPV with up to 1 trillion Korean won (KRW)
(10%) in subordinated loans and passed through the fiscal authority’s KRW 1 trillion (10%) in equity
capital, while the Bank of Korea committed to issuing up to KRW 8 trillion (80%) in senior loans.
Source: Authors’ analysis.

The US TALF II, CPFF II, MLF, MMLF, and CCFs received support from the Treasury through
either existing or newly allocated funds. The purpose of this support was to act as an equity
tranche to absorb any losses. Regardless of some initial uncertainty around what this equity
support meant, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin confirmed in testimony that for “any
facility that the Fed believes puts them at risk, I do put up capital, so by definition that capital
is at risk, and we are fully prepared to take losses, in certain scenarios, on that capital”
(Mnuchin 2020a; Wiggins and Feldberg 2020). He also clarified that “our intention is that we
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expect to take some losses on these facilities. That is our base-case scenario” (Committee on
Banking 2020). In its regular reports to the Congress and Chair Powell’s testimony, the Fed
consistently interpreted Secretary Mnuchin’s statement to mean that the Treasury would
take the first-loss position for the programs (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2022b; Powell 2020).
The US MMLF had another interesting structure embedded in the support it received from
the Treasury. Treasury charged the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston a facility fee associated
with the use of credit protection through the Exchange Stabilization Fund (Office of Inspector
General, US Department of the Treasury 2021; US Department of the Treasury 2020). The
fee for each loan was an amount equal to 90% of the difference between the rate charged to
the borrower on the MMLF loan and the primary credit rate at the time the loan was
advanced. Had the facility experienced losses, the MMLF would have first drawn on the
accumulated facility fees before drawing on the Treasury’s credit support (Office of
Inspector General, US Department of the Treasury 2021).
In South Korea, the BoK made it clear from the start that the fiscal authority’s participation
was to absorb any losses stemming from the program, while central bank funds were
allocated to provide liquidity for the program (Ministry of Economy and Finance 2020).
The Thai BSF was funded by the central bank with 1 billion Thai baht (THB), but the fiscal
authority promised indemnification of up to THB 40 billion for any losses. Any profits
generated from the program also would flow to the fiscal authority. The original plan, which
the authorities abandoned without explanation, was for the two public financial
corporations (the Government Savings Bank and Government Pension Fund), unnamed
insurance companies, and the Thai Bankers’ Association, a professional association
representing domestic banks, to fund the program.
The UK APF and Canadian PMMPP and PBPP also received indemnification from their fiscal
authorities. Cavallino and De Fiore (2020) confirm that fiscal and monetary authorities set
forth complementary responses because of the dramatic impact of the pandemic on the real
economy. They note the US Treasury’s support for the Fed’s programs and the UK HMT’s
guaranteeing 100% of the CP purchased by the BoE through the CCFF. Several other
governments guaranteed private nonfinancial sector loans and thus indirectly backed the
central banks’ lending operations.
11. Eligible Institutions: Who could participate in the program? Any additional
conditions to participate?
For the GFC-era MSPs, many programs were limited to counterparties that had preexisting
relationships with their central banks. The COVID-19 analogues of those programs tended to
remain the same. However, central banks tended to expand beyond the usual lists of
counterparties when establishing new programs.
The US TALF II and CPFF II had the same eligible institution criteria as their GFC-era
predecessors. Subsequently, however, the Fed expanded CPFF II eligibility to enable
municipalities to issue CP for the first time. This complemented the Fed’s expansion of the
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MMLF to accept a wider range of municipal instruments for secondary-market purchases.
This expansion was intended to be faster than the alternative of creating a secondary-market
facility for municipal-bond markets.
Some programs allowed participation only for financially sound institutions. As noted in Key
Design Decision No. 3, Legal Authority, some US MSPs required participants to certify their
solvency and their inability to acquire adequate credit from other sources. The UK CCFF also
looked at the health of eligible issuers, requiring potential participants to provide a shortterm investment-grade rating or other equivalent rating prior to the COVID-19 pandemic;
the BoE decided this eligibility on a case-by-case basis. The Bank of Thailand (BoT) allowed
only investment-grade or illiquid, but viable, Thai corporations (that had already secured at
least 50% of the value of their maturing bonds from private parties) to issue new CP to the
BSF.
12. Auction or Standing Facility: Was the program lending or purchasing through
auction or standing facility?
Our previous GFC-era MSP survey discussed the usage of auctions as a way of minimizing
stigma. Due possibly to the nature of the COVID-19 crisis having stemmed from the real
economy, stigma was not a central concern in 2020. Standing facilities were thus more
popular during the COVID-19 crisis. However, some jurisdictions used auctions so that
central banks could fulfill their price discovery goals without distorting markets.
Four programs in Canada (the CBPP, GBPP, PBPP, and BAPF), the UK APF, and Sweden used
auctions. The BoC was unclear about its rationale for using auctions for certain facilities and
not for others. The UK APF followed the same format it used in its GFC-era iteration of the
program. Sweden, on the other hand, provided a clear explanation of the benefits of using
auctions to maintain market neutrality while better supporting market functioning. These
justifications show the motivations for the auction format beyond just “avoiding stigma.”
When establishing the CBP, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank), the Swedish central bank,
pointed out that the small size, fragmentation, heterogeneity, limited liquidity, and lack of
transparency in its corporate-bond market made it hard for the central bank to evaluate the
purchased corporate bonds (Sveriges Riksbank 2020d). Therefore, the Riksbank decided to
employ both auction and standing methods (which the central bank refers to as “bilateral”)
in its purchases to maintain flexibility in its choice of bonds (Sveriges Riksbank 2020d;
Sveriges Riksbank 2020e). The Riksbank performed its initial transactions through bilateral
purchases, as this was the most common method used in Sweden’s corporate-bond market.
The Riksbank stated that it used this method to establish its presence in the market and
thereby gain capacity to influence pricing (Hansson and Birging 2021; Sveriges Riksbank
2020e). At a later stage, however, the Riksbank switched to auctions, as it expected the bid
procedure to reduce any market distortions (Sveriges Riksbank 2020f). Similarly, in using
only auctions for Sweden’s CPP, the Riksbank noted that auctions ensured that the purchases
were favorable to the functionality of the CP market and thereby promoted monetary policy
(Sveriges Riksbank 2020c).
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13. Loan or Purchase: How did the central bank participate in the market?
As observed in our previous survey, liquidity was provided to a troubled funding market
through either loans or purchases, including indirect purchases of assets. We also noted that
that US facilities mostly took the form of indirect purchases or loans to purchase assets.
Central banks use lending facilities in the hopes of reaching markets through the main
participants in those markets, which are typically banks as seen in the MMLF, but have also
included asset management firms and other nonbanks, as seen in the TALF II. In the US, the
MMLF, PDCF, PPPLF, and TALF II used lending facilities.
Additionally, we found new programs such as the UK CCFF and South Korea Special SPV
performing indirect purchases where they lent funds to an SPV that in turn purchased
eligible assets, as discussed in more detail in the Key Design Decision No. 8, Use of SPV.
Japan’s SFSO, as in its previous iteration in the GFC, provided interest-free loans to eligible
counterparties instead of directly purchasing eligible assets.
As cited in our previous survey, the loan-versus-purchase decision does not seem to have
made a noticeable difference on the effectiveness of MSPs.
14. Eligible Collateral or Assets: What assets was the central bank willing to accept for
the program?
The authorities set criteria for eligible collateral or assets depending on the program goals
and their risk appetite. The COVID-19-era MSPs included expanded eligibility criteria by
waiving certain restrictions to broaden their market reach. Some MSPs included terms more
generous toward credit-rating downgrades. Central banks ventured into new markets they
had not intervened in before the COVID-19 crisis. For example, the Fed intervened in
corporate-bond and municipal-bond markets.
The EU PEPP explicitly included Greek sovereign debt in its eligible assets, even though those
bonds did not meet credit-quality requirements. The ECB justified this decision by noting the
pandemic’s effects on Greek financial markets, the potential knock-on effects of a Greek
default, and the ECB’s increased ability to judge the situation because of its extraordinary
involvement in the Greek economy (ECB 2020). Greece had been subject to “enhanced
surveillance” by the ECB because of domestic financial crises in the early 2010s (ECB 2020).
The Swedish CPP lengthened the maturity of eligible CP during the operation of the program
to match the change in the aim of the program from short-term to longer-term stabilization.
Initially, the Riksbank accepted only CP with remaining maturity of three months or less,
both because (1) the substantial majority of outstanding CP in Sweden was issued with a
maturity of up to three months and (2) the central bank wanted to focus its support on
Swedish companies that needed to refinance loans that fell due during the period of the
program (Sveriges Riksbank 2020b). Later, as the Riksbank shifted the aim of the program
to continue reducing refinancing risks for companies, it extended the maturities of eligible
CP to six months (Sveriges Riksbank 2020b).

202

Market Support Programs

Rhee et al.

Many reiterations of GFC-era MSPs also started with an expanded list of eligible collateral or
assets. For example, the COVID-19-era TALF II accepted static collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs), which were previously ineligible under the GFC-era TALF. Spreads on these assets
had initially tightened following the announcement of the TALF II but tightened further
following the collateral expansion (Caviness and Sarkar 2020).
The MMLF initially accepted Treasuries, fully guaranteed agency securities, governmentsponsored enterprise (GSE) securities, and both secured and unsecured CP as collateral—a
much broader range of collateral than the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), which accepted only highly rated ABCP during the
GFC. On March 20, 2020, the MMLF further expanded eligibility to include municipal shortterm debt and variable-rate demand notes, because of strains in short-term funding markets
for municipalities, and negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs), after tax-exempt money
market mutual funds saw large outflows that were likely contributing to the worsening
conditions in short-term municipal-debt markets (President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets 2020).
Unlike the US MMLF and CPFF II programs, the EU, UK, and Swedish CP purchase programs
allowed for CP issued only by nonfinancial corporations. This is interesting, considering that
in Europe, while the vast majority of CP issuances are by banks and public authorities, the
ECB and UK CP purchase programs did not include financial CP or CDs as eligible assets
(Novick et al. 2020).
Some programs extended eligibility to non-investment-grade assets. This is particularly
interesting in cases where the program introduced in the acute phase had a design that
enabled it to extend into the chronic phase. The first program to do this, the US CPFF, initially
accepted only highly rated commercial paper. It later revised the terms to include
commercial paper issuers that were in the highest rating class as of March 17, 2020, but had
subsequently been downgraded. It allowed the downgraded issuer to make a one-time sale
to the CPFF II, with the goal of allowing them to roll over maturing CP while seeking
alternative funding (Boyarchenko et al. 2021).The PMCCF similarly expanded to include
downgraded corporate bonds, termed “fallen angels,” and the SMCCF expanded to include
sub-investment grade ETFs. Credit spreads for these bonds improved considerably after the
announcement (S&P Global Market Intelligence 2020). The announcement also coincided
with the passage of the CARES Act, which expanded the Treasury’s committed equity
investment in the CCFs from USD 20 billion to USD 75 billion (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 2020b; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2020c).
That the Fed was taking on higher risk for the fallen angels was taken into consideration in
calculating the leverage ratio against the Treasury’s committed equity investment.
The Canada CBPP also accepted bonds that satisfied the required credit ratings before April
15, 2020, even if they had been later downgraded below those levels to a certain degree,
provided they retained at least one rating of BBB Low/BBB-/Baa3 or higher (Bank of Canada
2020a). Similarly, the BoK accepted bonds issued by issuers of a certain investment grade
before April 22, 2020, even if they were downgraded to junk status after that date because
of the COVID-19 crisis (Kwon 2022).
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In contrast, none of the GFC-era MSP programs reviewed in our previous survey included an
exception for fallen angels. They typically included features to protect the central bank in the
event of a rating-agency downgrade. For example, the Fed’s Money Market Investor Funding
Facility and the BoE’s Commercial Paper Facility closed further program access to any issuer
that had been downgraded.
Although central banks tended to be more generous to downgrades during the COVID-19
crisis, some were more restrictive or included terms protecting the central bank in case of a
downgrade. For example, the COVID-19-era US PDCF accepted only investment-grade
instruments, while the GFC-era PDCF had accepted non-investment-grade securities (Yang
2020). However, other terms of the PDCF became more generous. Sweden’s CBP
immediately excluded further purchases if an issuer or its bonds were downgraded. Still, the
central bank did not sell the bonds it already held from such downgraded issuers (Sveriges
Riksbank 2021a).
15. Haircuts or Discounts (purchase price or loan amounts): Was the value for the
accepted collateral or assets subject to markdowns?
In the previous survey, we observed that the loan amount or the purchase price set for MSPs
during the GFC generally incorporated a haircut or discount on the value of underlying
collateral or purchased assets. Some MSPs during the COVID-19 crisis did not impose such
reductions, including Canada PMMPP, US MMLF (the analogue to the GFC-era AMLF), and US
PPPLF. In the US CCFs, neither the primary- and secondary-market program offered
discounts, although the primary-market program did impose a penalty rate of interest.
Regulation A states that the Fed should charge penalty rates for extensions of credit. The Fed
interpreted Regulation A as applying to primary-market purchases but not purchases on the
secondary market (Congressional Oversight Commission 2020b). Sweden CBP had no preset
discounts; but in bilateral purchases, prices were negotiated with the seller.
Many other programs looked to market conditions and market rates to determine
markdowns. Some based any reductions on the riskiness of the collateral or assets, similar
to standard practice during the GFC-era programs. The Sweden CPP’s discounts reflected the
maturity and credit ratings of the counterparties. The haircut was used as a minimum rate
for participating in the auctions; this further ensured that the auctions functioned as a
stabilizing measure for the CP market (Hansson and Birging 2021). The Canadian CPPP, and
US TALF II and PDCF, also imposed haircuts and discounts based on the ratings of the asset
or collateral. Japan’s SFSO priced collateral using historical market-price fluctuations and the
assets’ residual maturity.
16. Interest Rates: Were any interest rates or premium rates imposed on the
transactions?
Similar to those of the GFC-era’s lending facilities, the COVID-era MSPs’ interest rates
reflected market rates from normal times plus a premium reflecting the risks of the
underlying collateral. This allowed programs to be rendered unattractive as market
functioning normalized.
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For example, the interest rates on US TALF II loans were generally high relative to the
historical coupon rates on ABS and CMBS and varied depending on the characteristics of the
underlying collateral. The MLF also charged a primary rate plus a spread based on collateral
type. The Fed explained that these rates complied with Regulation A’s condition to charge a
penalty rate, interpreting that to mean a rate that “is a premium to the market rate in normal
circumstances” but “affords liquidity in unusual and exigent circumstances” (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York 2020a).
Japan’s SFSO uniquely stands out because it provided interest-free loans and effectively had
the central bank compensate participating banks for making qualifying loans. Under the
program, the BoJ made collateralized loans to creditworthy financial cooperatives and the
Development Bank of Japan, which in turned used the funds to lend to SMEs. The BoJ
promised to pay a positive 0.2% interest rate on a portion of a financial institution’s account
reserve balances with the central bank corresponding to the outstanding amount of loans
made by it to SMEs (Category 1). It also promised to pay a 0.1% interest rate on a portion of
a financial institution’s account reserve balances with the central bank corresponding to the
amount of its SFSO loans minus the amount in Category 1. This was at a time when the BoJ’s
policy rate was negative 0.1%. The BoJ also agreed to add twice the amount of an institution’s
lending from the SFSO to its macro add-on balances13 (Bank of Japan 2020).
The US PMCCF did impose a penalty rate of interest. In Thailand, the BoT went further and
set some more onerous terms, including imposing a premium rate above a base rate for
calculating the purchase price. The base rate was equal to the maximum of the rate on its
new bank loan and the rate on new bonds it issued on the market. The facility premium
increased depending on the issuer’s funding needs from 100 basis points (bps) for shortterm debt equivalent to 30% of the issuer’s funding needs to 200 bps for any amount
exceeding 30% of the funding needs (Bank of Thailand 2020).
17. Fees: Did the program impose any fees for participating in the program?
Most of the non-US MSPs did not collect fees other than those associated with regular
operational fees generally imposed in financial transactions. The UK CCFF and the US TALF
II, CPFF II, and MLF imposed administrative and operational fees. The US PDCF did not
impose any fees this time around, whereas the GFC-era PDCF had imposed frequency-based
fees. The primary-market program of the US CCFs charged a 100-bp facility fee while the
secondary-market program did not; this distinction was driven by an interpretation of
Regulation A’s penalty-rate condition as applying to primary-market but not secondarymarket purchases.
18. Term (i.e., loan maturity): In a loan, what was the term?
In the US MMLF, the term for lending via the program matched the term of underlying
collateral; this was consistent with the GFC-era analogue AMLF program. The COVID-19-era
Macro add-on balances are the portion of financial institutions’ account reserve balances with the central
bank that carry a zero-interest rate and increasing them would proportionately decrease the amount of
balances subject to a negative interest rate.
13
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PPPLF also incorporated this feature. Some programs extended the maturity for the loans
compared to their counterpart programs during the GFC. The US narrowed PDCF asset
eligibility during the COVID-19 crisis but lengthened the term of the loans from overnight to
90 days. Japan’s COVID-era SFSO limited the loan term to one year, although most loans
ended up being three to six months. In contrast, the GFC-era SFSO provided one- to threemonth loans (Bank of Japan 2021; Buchholtz 2020).
On the other hand, the COVID-19-era TALF II provided only three-year loans and did not
extend terms to five years as did in the GFC-era TALF II, although eligible collateral included
assets with a maturity of three years or more. We have not been able to determine why the
COVID-19-era TALF II did not extend its loan terms to five years.
19. Other Restrictions on Eligible Participants: Were there any other restrictions and
conditions for the participants?
Some jurisdictions imposed additional restrictions on institutions participating in COVID19-era programs that they had not imposed during the GFC. The UK prohibited the
nonfinancial corporations that participated in the CCFF program from paying dividends and
capital distributions and restricted senior executive pay to possibly combat negative public
opinion on the program. Such restrictions were more common in capital-injection programs,
where the public was more likely to object to special treatment for aid recipients.
Several COVID-19-era MSPs required participants to use the proceeds of their programs for
specific purposes.
For example, Thailand allowed participants to pay off only existing maturing bonds and
prohibited them from engaging in stock buybacks, repaying other debt early, lending or
paying dividends to shareholders, giving bonuses to board members or the firm’s top two
executives, or pledging assets as collateral for new loans. The BoT enforced these conditions
by requiring participants to submit reports (Bank of Thailand 2020).
The Fed’s MLF required participants to use the proceeds: (1) to help manage the cash flow
impact of higher expenses and delayed or reduced tax revenues; (2) to pay interest or
principal on outstanding debt; or (3) to purchase notes issued by, or otherwise to assist,
political subdivisions and other governmental entities. The Fed and Treasury especially
encouraged (3) as it was “logistically infeasible for the Fed to directly purchase notes from
all U.S. municipalities” (Congressional Oversight Commission 2020a).
Some programs included other behavioral restrictions. For example, the BoK, to promote a
certain level of employment for a set period, promised to encourage middle-market
enterprises and large corporations issuing debt to the SPV to meet minimum employment
thresholds. However, research did not reveal whether the thresholds were enforced.
The Swedish CBP subsequently added “sustainability” to its eligibility criteria and reported
the aggregate carbon footprint of the central bank’s bond holdings. The Sveriges Riksbank
announced that it would purchase only assets from companies that complied with
international standards and norms for sustainability (Sveriges Riksbank 2020f; Sveriges
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Riksbank 2020h). It reasoned that this was to manage government funds prudently by
reducing the financial risks that could follow from climate change or from companies failing
to comply with international standards and norms as well as safeguarding long-term
sustainable economic development (Sveriges Riksbank 2020g). It also wanted to uphold the
state’s core values, as it was concerned about reputational risks (Andersson and Stenström
2021).
Overall, we believe that authorities should tread lightly when using crisis interventions to
advance noncrisis goals. The best argument for their usage is when the noncrisis goals are
sufficiently popular that they can support the public opinion of the interventions and give
them the necessary time to work. But, to the extent that these noncrisis goals are politically
fraught or operationally challenging, the risk of damaging the crisis response, particularly
during an acute phase, is significant.
20. Regulatory Relief: Did the program provide for any regulatory relief to enable
easier access to the program or make participation in the program more
attractive? Did the loan under the program, if applicable, receive any regulatory
relief?
In the US, bank regulators excluded MMLF participations from regulatory-capital
calculations. Industry participants argued that the absence of such specific capital relief in
Europe for a similar purchase program resulted in lighter usage than for the US program,
although European regulators did offer banks more general capital relief. US regulators also
ruled that MMLF and PPPLF participation would not impact a bank’s liquidity coverage ratio,
which came into effect in 2014 as one of the post-GFC regulatory reforms in liquidity
requirements for banks. The PPPLF set rules to neutralize any effect on a bank’s leverage
ratio.
Also, in the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission and bank regulators, through noaction letters, allowed banks and other fund sponsors to use the MMLF to purchase assets
from affiliated money market funds (MMFs), providing relief from rules restricting such
transactions. In Europe, which bans “sponsor support” for funds but allows MMF sponsors
to transact with their affiliated MMFs in the ordinary course of business, the European
Securities and Markets Authority issued a note clarifying the circumstances under which it
would consider such transactions to be sponsor support (European Securities and Markets
Authority 2020).
21. Program Duration: When did the program end?
Most programs went through multiple rounds of extension because of lingering effects and
slow recovery from the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. Some programs set very early end dates
that the authorities had to extend soon thereafter. An authority’s decision to extend a
program does not necessarily indicate that it had made a mistake when setting an early end
date. However, authorities should ensure that they review program end dates and make any
extension decisions without delay, as market conditions may have not improved in the
initially expected period. Sweden originally scheduled its CPP to end May 31, 2020, but
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ultimately extended it four times to December 31, 2021. Other programs, like Canada’s CPPP,
CBPP, and PBPP, set end dates a year or more from their initial dates of operation. The BoI
initially said that it would continue purchases under the CBPP until market conditions
improved; it ceased purchasing assets on November 5, 2020.
In the US, as discussed in the Key Design Decision No. 10, Source(s) of Funding, certain MSPs
were backed by USD 195 billion committed by the Treasury under the CARES Act. On
November 19, 2020, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin sent a letter to Fed Chair Powell stating
that he would not extend the four remaining lending facilities that used funds from the
CARES Act after December 31, 2020. He asked the Fed to return the Treasury’s unused funds
for those facilities. On the same day, the Fed released a public response to Mnuchin stating it
would “prefer that the full suite of emergency facilities established during the coronavirus
pandemic continue to serve their important role as a backstop for our still-strained and
vulnerable economy” (Mnuchin 2020b). The Fed’s reaction seems warranted, as Treasury’s
decision was equivalent to forcing an early termination of a valuable option. The next day,
though, Chair Powell confirmed the Fed would return the unused portions of the funds
allocated to the CARES Act facilities as Mnuchin had requested (Powell 2020). The
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, signed into law on December 27, 2020, definitively
closed the CARES Act Fed facilities and rescinded funds “not needed to meet the
commitments, as of January 9, 2021, of the programs and facilities established”
(“Consolidated Appropriations Act” 2021).

Conclusion
Nonbank financial intermediation continued to grow across the world in the decade between
the GFC and the COVID-19 crisis. Although many MSPs in the US and UK during the COVID19 crisis were near copies of analogous GFC MSPs, they tended to be broader in eligibility
and more generous in other terms. Furthermore, several countries launched MSPs for the
first time.
Armed with their experience during the GFC, the Fed and other central banks quickly
launched a series of MSPs within a couple of weeks of the World Health Organization
declaring the COVID-19 as a pandemic. The quick actions showed the value of a clear ex ante
understanding of a central bank’s authorities and a playbook already in place for launching
MSPs.
The COVID-19-era MSPs also showed the benefits of using an SPV. Other countries joined the
US in these using the structure: South Korea, Japan, , and Thailand. These vehicles provide
clarity in program outcomes, ease of administration, and a clear balance sheet separation for
the government.
Unlike the GFC, where the troubles started in the financial sector, the COVID-19 crisis started
in the real economy. Central banks and fiscal authorities collaborated more than they had in
the GFC. The aims of COVID-19-era MSPs were far-reaching, especially in the advanced
economies. Some MSPs went beyond the liquidity support needed in the acute phase and
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morphed into broader credit support programs during the anticipated chronic phase. These
credit support designs were often novel attempts by central banks to complement the
conventional and unconventional monetary policies they were using to head off COVID-19induced recessions.
As these are more recent programs, conclusive judgments about their efficacy are not yet
possible. Furthermore, as noted in our previous survey, the efficacy of a single MSP will often
be impossible to identify, since governments launch many other interventions around the
same time. Nevertheless, the evidence to date suggests that COVID-19-era MSPs were
effective at reducing market stress during the acute phase of the COVID-19 crisis. In several
cases, the announcement of the program was itself effective in calming the markets, even
when the ultimate usage of those same programs was minimal.
Analysts have identified evidence of announcement effects in Canada GBPP and CBPP,
Sweden CBP, and multiple programs in the US (Fratto et al. 2021). BoC staff research finds
that the announcement of the GBPP lowered Government of Canada bond yields by an
average of 10 bps, most of which the BoC attributed to signaling (Arora et al. 2021). Similarly,
although CBPP purchases were limited, a former BoC economist notes that the program
reduced illiquidity in corporate bonds (Andolfatto, Nelson, and Kronick 2020; Bank of
Canada 2020b). In Sweden, the Riksbank found that the corporate-debt market recovered
shortly after the announcement in March 2020 of the bank’s intent to purchase commercial
paper in April and corporate bonds sometime between March and December 2020 (Hansson
and Birging 2021). Boyarchenko, Kovner, and Shachar (2020) find that the CCFs positively
impacted the US corporate-bond market through several channels: (1) the announcement of
the facilities improved the outlook for the economy as a whole, reducing credit risk and
therefore risk premia; (2) the Fed, acting as a buyer of last resort, increased dealers’
willingness to trade corporate-debt securities and therefore improved liquidity in the
market; and (3) the purchases and the presence of a backstop facility directly supported
markets for eligible securities (Boyarchenko, Kovner, and Shachar 2020).
For the more ambitious chronic-phase goal of credit support, the relatively quick recovery
of financial markets rendered most of these programs unnecessary, and thus their creative
design features to be untested. Nevertheless, designers should make note of these features,
debate their merits, and prepare for the next crisis, when such designs may indeed be
necessary.
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